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Abstract
This paper explores the performance of residential real estate agents and the commission
structure under which they operate. This study reveals the interrelationship among the
number of properties sold by an agent, the dollar volume of sales, and real estate agent
income. This research shows that the ability to generate listings is essential to generating
higher levels of income in residential real estate sales. The listings become the platform
from which agents leverage their human capital in the generation of income. However,
the ability to generate listings is a skill related to experience, as well as to the firm and
market environment.
The real estate brokerage industry is a major employer in the United States. The National
Association of Realtors (NAR) estimates there are approximately 2.5 million real estate
professionals licensed by the various states. These agents are employed in 236,000 real
estate broker office locations across the county. About 1.2 million real estate professionals
are NAR members. In 2004, the sale of new and existing homes amounted to
approximately $1.9 trillion. The NAR estimates that the housing sector directly accounts
for 15% of U.S. gross domestic product (GDP).
This paper explores the performance of residential real estate agents and the commission
structure under which they operate. While numerous studies have examined broker
earnings and commission rates, the current study develops a testable model that relates
the number of housing transactions, sales, and commissions to the source of the listing.1
In the model, agents choose to focus their efforts on developing listings, selling other
agents’ houses, or selling their own listings. Since these activities require specific and
distinct skills, agents who perform these three activities have differing demographic
characteristics, and the characteristics of firms with which the agents are affiliated differ
as well. Empirical evidence from the 2005 NAR Membership Survey supports the testable
model and shows that agent and firm characteristics are related to the source of the
listing sale.
The Market for Brokerage Services
Agents act on the behalf of clients in the sale and purchase of their clients’ houses. In a
world of perfect information where sellers know the potential buyers and maximum
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prices they are willing to pay, home sellers and buyers would not need agents. In reality,
however, information is far from perfect, and agents provide information to sellers and
buyers in exchange for a commission rate based on the sales price of the property.
Firm Output, Revenue, and Listing Specialization
A number of studies have examined production and revenue at the brokerage-firm level.
Jud, Rogers, and Crellin (1994) find that the number of homes sold by residential real
estate firms increases with the size of the metropolitan area, firm size and age, and MLS
affiliation. For the average firm, net revenue increases 9.0% because of franchise affiliation.
Operating efficiency studies of real estate firms have been undertaken by Zumpano, Elder,
and Crellin (1993), Zumpano and Elder (1994), and Anderson, Fok, Zumpano, and Elder
(1998) among others. Zumpano, Elder, and Crellin find a U-shaped cost curve with modest
economies of scale. Zumpano and Elder report that a balanced mix of listings and sales
are optimal at the firm level and minimize cost. Their study, however, does not examine
specialization at the agent level. Anderson et al. find that real estate brokerage firms
operate inefficiently because of suboptimal input allocations and failure to operate at
constant returns to scale, and firm size is positively related to efficiency levels.
Richins, Black, and Sirmans (1987) utilize cluster analysis to explore the operations of
brokerage firms. They find that firms tend to self-select one of three strategic orientations
for the generation of revenue: (1) obtaining listings that are sold by other firms; (2) selling
properties that are listed by other firms; and (3) selling the firm’s own listings.2
Listing Specialization and Residential Real Estate Licensee Income
Research relating licensee compensation to various measures of productivity is quite
extensive. Most of these studies draw on human capital theory developed by Mincer
(1970) and others. Studies by Follain, Lutes, and Meir (1987), Crellin, Frew, and Jud
(1988), Glower and Hendershott (1988), and Sirmans and Swicegood (1997, 2000) have
found that age, experience, hours worked, firm size, and technology have a positive
influence on licensee earnings. Research by Munneke and Yavas (2001) has focused on
compensation incentives and performance.3
A recent study by Johnson, Zumpano, and Anderson (2007) examines licensee
compensation as it relates to listing specialization. Using the NAR 2001 Membership
Survey data, they find that listings specialization, defined as the ratio of revenue
transactions from listings to total revenue transactions, is positively related to licensee
income. In their concluding section, the authors pose two important issues for further
research: (1) why does specialization in listings make agents more productive; and (2)
why are not all agents listing specialists? The present study addresses these issues.
A Model of Agent Transactions, Sales, and Income
Following Richins, Black, and Sirmans (1987), brokerage services can be classified into
three categories: (1) sales by agents of their own listings; (2) sales by agents of other
agents’ listings; and (3) listings of an agent that are sold by other agents. In the analysis
that follows, separate equations are estimated for each of the three brokerage activities
because the requisite skills and talents of agents differ and each of these brokerage
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functions is assumed to require different labor and capital inputs. In contrast to Richins,
Black, and Sirmans, the present study is focused at the agent level rather than at the firm
level.
An empirical model of brokerage service production is developed where production, or
output, is measured by the quantity of home sales (see Equation (1)). The estimated
brokerage production function is similar to that estimated by Jud, Rogers, and Crellin
(1994). The variables used to measure the individual labor inputs include the number of
hours worked (Hrs), the number of years of schooling (Sch), and the level of real estate
market experience (Exp).4 In addition, race/ethnicity (Black) and gender (Female) may
influence the quantity of houses sold because of differences in the opportunity to sell
properties to prospective customers. Marital status (Married) is included as a variable
that influences an individual’s motivation to generate sales.
Capital components include firm characteristics, such as firm size, technology, and
franchise affiliation. Office size (Sfsizoff) is measured by the number of salespersons
associated with a particular office and firm size (Sfsizf) by the number of agents in the
firm. Sales agents in smaller firms may concentrate their efforts on selling their own
listings because of the lack of connectivity with other agents and firms, and also, because
smaller firms may be more likely to prevail in smaller markets.
The use of information technology (Techf) is expected to increase the quantity of houses
sold.5 Market size is captured by the natural log of employment (Emp) in the metropolitan
area. The pricing strength of the housing market is captured by the change in housing
prices in a specific market (%HPI). This change is measured by the percentage change
in the Office of Federal Housing Enterprise Oversight (OFHEO) index in the particular
metropolitan area.
Using agent characteristics, firm characteristics, and market information, the general form
of the broker’s production model is defined as follows:
Ln(Q )  f(Hrs, Exp, Exp2, Sch, Black, Married, Techf, Sfsizf, Sfsizoff, Indnfr,i
Ln(Emp), %HPI). (1)
Where:
Qi  The quantity of houses sold in 2004 by an agent categorized by: (1) sales by
agents of other agents’ listings (Otherlist); (2) sales by agents of their own
listings (Ownlist); or (3) listings of an agent that are sold by other agents
(Elselist);
Hrs  The number of hours worked per week by the sales agent in 2004;
Exp  The number of years of real estate experience of the sales agent;
Exp2  The number of years of real estate experience squared of the sales agent;
Sch  The number of years of schooling;
Black  A dummy variable for an African-American sales agent;
Female  A dummy variable indicating the agent is female;
Married  A dummy variable indicating the agent is married;
Techf  A factor analysis variable constructed using technology variables;6
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Sfsizf  The number of agents (in thousands) in the firm of the sales agent;
Sfsizoff  The number of agents in the individual office of the sales agent;
Indnfr  A dummy variable indicating an independent, non-franchise firm;
Emp  Employment (in thousands) in the metropolitan area in December 2004; and
%HPI  The percentage change in the OFHEO house price index during 2004.
The total home sales measured in dollars (revenue) are assumed to be defined by Equation
(2). The revenue model includes characteristics of the agent, firm, and the market.
Agents who possess more experience (Exp) are likely to generate more sales through
efficiency and/or by selling higher-priced houses.7 The hours worked (Hrs) variable
measures the sales effort of the agent. Firm characteristics such as office size, firm size,
and franchise affiliation also may influence sales volume because they provide sales agents
with the infrastructure to support sales.8 The use of technology is expected to increase
sales. Studies by Sirmans and Swicegood (2000), Benjamin, Jud, Roth, and Winkler (2002)
and Jud, Winkler, and Sirmans (2002) suggest that the use of information technology is
positively related to sales revenue.
A vector of market characteristics includes market size, measured by the level of
employment (Emp), and the pricing strength of the market, measured by the percentage
change in housing prices in the specific metropolitan market (%HPI). The rate of
housing price change (%HPI) is measured using data compiled by OFHEO.
In addition, a vector of agent characteristics may influence the price category of houses
sold by a particular agent. Agents who have fewer years of schooling (Sch), who are
African-American (Black), who are Female (Female), or who are married (Married) may
have clientele at different price categories.
The empirical model to estimate the dollar volume of home sales (revenue) is defined as
follows:
Sales  f(Otherlist, Ownlist, Elselist, Hrs, Exp, Exp2, Sch, Black, Female,
Married,Techf, Sfsizf, Sfsizoff, Indnfr, ln(Emp), %HPI). (2)
Where:
Sales  The dollar amount of housing sales (revenue) by the agent in 2004;
Otherlist  The number of houses sold by agents in 2004 that originate from other
agents’ listings;
Ownlist  The number of houses sold by agents in 2004 that originate from their own
listings;
Elselist  The number of houses sold by agents in 2004 that originate from their own
listings but that are sold by other agents in 2004;
Hrs  The number of hours worked per week by the sales agent in 2004;
Exp  The number of years of real estate experience of the sales agent;
Exp2  The number of years of real estate experience squared of the sales agent;
Sch  The number of years of schooling of agents;
Black  A dummy variable for face indicating that the agent is African-American;
Female  A dummy variable indicating the agent is female;
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Married  A dummy variable indicating the respondent is married;
Techf  A factor analysis variable constructed using technology variables;9
Sfsizf  The number of agents (in thousands) in the firm of the sales agent;
Sfsizoff  The number of agents in the individual office of the sales agent;
Indnfr  A dummy variable indicating an independent, non-franchise firm;
Emp  Employment (in 1,000s) in the metropolitan area in December 2004; and
%HPI  The percentage change in the standardized OFHEO index by metropolitan
area (2003.4  100) in 2004.10
The level of income earned by the agent for a given level of sales is defined by Equation
(3). Since agents are compensated on a commission system, agent income is directly
related to the dollar volume of housing sales. However, while housing sales are positively
related to agent income, the housing sales generated by an agent’s own listings, the
housing sales by an agent of listings of other agents, and the sales of an agent’s listings
by other agents may involve different commission rates. In addition, commission rates
also are likely associated with real estate market conditions. During a strong seller’s
market, commission rates are likely to be lower because sellers are more easily able to
sell their houses quickly and at higher prices. The housing market strength is measured
by the percentage change in average housing prices (%HPI) in 2004. The average
percentage change in each metropolitan market is determined using the OFHEO index.
The empirical model for estimating the agent income is as follows:
Income  f(Sales, Pownlist, Pelselist, %HPI). (3)
Where:
Income  Earnings (or income) of agents in 2004;
Sales  The dollar amount of housing sales by agents in 2004;
Pownlist  An interaction term of the proportion of Ownlist and Sales defined as
Sales*(Ownlist/(Otherlist  Ownlist  Elselist),
Pelselist  An interaction term of the proportion of Elselist and Sales defined as
Sales*(Elselist/(Otherlist  Ownlist  Elselist); and
%HPI  The percentage change in the standardized OFHEO index by metropolitan
area (2003.4  100) in 2004.
In Equation (3), the estimated coefficient on the Sales variable provides an estimate of
the average commission rate received by agents who sell the listings of other agents. The
coefficients on the Pownlist and Pelselist variables provide estimates of the marginal
increase in the commission rate received by agents who sell their own listings or agents
whose listings are sold by others.
Data and Empirical Results
The data for this study are obtained from 2005 NAR Membership Survey. The survey was
sent to 120,000 members; 8,450 usable responses were generated, which represents
about a 7.0% response rate. The survey includes demographic data, business activities,
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Exhibit 1. Number of Home Sales in 2004 (Qi)
Independent Variables
Dependent Variables
ln(Otherlist)
Coeff. t-Statistic
ln(Ownlist)
Coeff. t-Statistic
ln(Elselist)
Coeff. t-Statistic
Constant 1.3207 5.25** 1.0239 3.15** 0.5689 2.15**
Hrs 0.0198 12.17** 0.0197 9.26** 0.0197 11.06**
Exp 0.0624 7.25** 0.0487 4.77** 0.0898 10.33**
Exp2 0.0015 5.79** 0.0009 2.96** 0.0019 7.66**
Sch 0.0231 1.98* 0.0235 1.53 0.0102 0.82
Black 0.0387 0.36 0.1632 1.20 0.2900 2.35**
Female 0.0109 0.22 0.1485 2.49** 0.0178 0.35
Married 0.0278 0.53 0.1141 1.85* 0.0815 1.50
Techf 0.1115 4.02** 0.0383 1.19 0.0865 3.10**
Sfsizf 0.0001 0.87 0.0002 2.39** 0.0001 1.08
Sfsizoff 0.0027 1.55 0.0032 1.45 0.0025 1.27
Indnfr 0.0554 1.07 0.0457 0.72 0.0754 1.37
Log(Emp) 0.0286 1.21 0.0837 2.91** 0.0221 0.91
%HPI 0.0024 0.75 0.0030 0.81 0.0016 0.46
R 2 0.200 0.178 0.243
Adj. R 2 0.193 0.167 0.235
S.E. of regression 0.858 0.927 0.875
Note: The equations are estimated using the White (1980) procedure for consistent standard errors in the
presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form. Number of observations: Otherlist  1,338; Ownlist 
1,025; Elselist  1,255.
*Statistically significant at the 5% level, one-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 1% level, one-tailed test.
characteristics of brokerage firms, the use of technology, and income and expenses for
2004. The means and standard deviations of all variables used in the analysis are shown
in the Appendix (Exhibit A.1).
Exhibit 1 shows the three regression estimates for Equation (1). All of the equations are
estimated using the White (1980) procedure for consistent standard errors in the presence
of heteroscedasticity of unknown form. The regressions have adjusted R-square values
between 0.167 and 0.235, and all regressions are statistically significant at the 0.01 level.
The number of hours worked per week is positively related to the number of houses
sold. Each hour of additional work per week corresponds to about a 2% increase in the
number of houses sold. The increase is similar for all three categories of listing sales.
The findings for the experience (Exp) indicate a much stronger positive relation with
Elselist than for Otherlist or Ownlist. For agents’ listings that are sold through other agents
(Elselist), there is an 8.6% increase in listings sold per year of experience with the first
year of experience.11 For agents who sell other agents’ listings (Otherlist), the increase is
5.9% for the first year of experience, while agents selling their own listings (Ownlist)
show a 4.7% increase the first year. With the fifth year of experience, for agents’ listings
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that are sold through other agents the marginal increase is 7.1%, while for agents who
sell other agents’ listings and agents selling their own listings, the gain is 4.8% and 4.0%,
respectively.
The schooling variable (Sch) has a negative impact on home sales in all three of the
equations in Exhibit 1, but it is statistically significant at the 0.05 level only in the Otherlist
equation. This suggests that brokers with more formal schooling tend to sell fewer
properties listed by other agents.
Marital status appears positively associated with the number of houses sold, but it is
statistically significant at the 0.05 level only for Ownlist. The racial variable (Black) is
negative and statistically significant only in the Elselist equation. The gender variable
(Female) is negative but statistically significant at the 0.05 level only for Ownlist. These
finding could be consistent with discrimination by other agents and/or buyers; however,
other explanations also are plausible.12
The estimated coefficients on the technology variable (Techf) are statistically significant
in the Otherlist and Elselist regressions at the 0.01 level, but not significant in the Ownlist
equation. The importance of information technology as a factor affecting agent sales
conforms to the results for income reported by Benjamin, Jud, Roth, and Winkler (2002)
and Jud, Winkler, and Sirmans (2002).
Firm size (Sfsizf) is not statistically significant in the Otherlist and Elselist regressions. It
has a negative and significant effect on agent sales of their own listings (Ownlist). An
increase of 1,000 agents in the firm is estimated to reduce agent sales of their own listings
by 20.0%. This finding provides evidence that the selling activities of agents in a firm
differ as the firms become larger.
Office size (Sfsizoff) is not statistically significant in any of the equations in Exhibit 1.
The estimated coefficient is negative only in the Ownlist equation. Also, whether or not
an agent is affiliated with an independent, non-franchised firm does not have a statistically
measurable impact on the number of houses sold. The estimated coefficients are negative
for Otherlist and Elselist.
The Emp variable measures the size of the metropolitan area. Emp is negatively related
to houses sold for all three regressions, but statistically significant only in the Ownlist
equation.13 The rate of housing price inflation as measured by %HPI does not have a
statistically significant effect on the number of houses sold in any of the three regressions
in Exhibit 1.
Exhibit 2 presents the estimates from the Sales equation. The adjusted R-square value is
0.372. Of the three categories of sales listings, Elselist has the greatest influence on dollar
sales. Total sales volume increases by $83,592 for agents’ listings sold by other agents. In
comparison, sales increase by $20,318 for agents who sell their own listings, and for
other agents’ listings sold by an agent, sales increase by $36,402. The dominance in size
of coefficient for Elselist suggests that a strategy of leveraging one’s human capital as an
agent by letting other agents sell one’s listings can lead to a higher dollar volume of
housing sales.
Hours worked (Hrs) and real estate market experience (Exp) exert strong positive impacts
on the dollar volume of sales reported by agents. An additional hour of work per week
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Exhibit 2. Dollar Value of Home Sales in 2004 (Sales)
Independent Variables Coeff. t-Statistic
Constant 3,847,307.0 5.37**
Otherlist 36,402.4 2.32**
Ownlist 20,317.5 1.14
Elselist 83,591.5 7.59**
Hrs 29,204.7 4.90**
Exp 164,921.0 4.69**
Exp2 3,598.6 3.42**
Sch 111,774.3 3.28**
Black 732,149.1 2.86**
Female 25,024.2 0.17
Married 171,054.1 1.16
Techf 418,958.7 4.49**
Sfsizf 595.4 2.41**
Sfsizoff 790.0 0.16
Indnfr 205,586.7 1.39
Log(Emp) 137,401.4 2.06*
%HPI 46,265.5 4.34**
Observations 1,458
R 2 0.379
Adj. R 2 0.372
S.E. of regression 2,579,934
Note: The equation is estimated using the White (1980) procedure for consistent standard errors in the
presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form.
*Statistically significant at the 5% level, one-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 1% level, one-tailed test.
generates $29,205 in sales revenue per year. Likewise, an additional year of experience
increases sales by $157,724 ($164,921  $7,197) after the first year as an agent. Sales
reach a maximum with 23 years of experience. Firm size (Sfsizf) is statistically significant
at the 0.01 level. The estimated coefficient suggests that sales increase $595 per year with
each additional agent in the firm. In contrast, office size (Sfsizoff) and non-affiliated firm
(Indnfr) are statistically insignificant as determinants of agent sales.
Schooling (Sch) has a pivotal role in human capital theory. The schooling coefficient in
the Sales equation is statistically significant at the 0.01 level and above. The coefficient
is positive and indicates an increase in sales of $111,774 per year of formal schooling.
The positive effect appears to arise from the higher-priced homes sold by agents with
more formal schooling, not because agents with more schooling sell more homes (the
coefficients on Sch in Exhibit 1 are all negative).
The effects of race (Black) and gender (Female) are found to be negative, but the effects
of gender are not statistically significant. Marital status (Married) has a positive impact
on sales but also is not statistically significant.
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Exhibit 3. Income in 2004 (Income)
Independent Variables Coeff. t-Statistic
Constant 15,278.190 3.10**
Sales 0.016 8.02**
Pownlist 0.018 4.81**
Pelselist 0.008 2.61**
%HPI 543.699 1.56
Observations 1,116
R-squared 0.392
Adjusted R-squared 0.390
S.E. of regression 92,269
Note: The equation is estimated using the White (1980) procedure for consistent standard errors in the
presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown form.
*Statistically significant at the 5% level, one-tailed test.
**Statistically significant at the 1% level, one-tailed test.
The use of information technology (Techf) exerts a strong positive impact on agent sales.
The technology factor variable consists of both individual- and firm-related technologies,
so there is a combinational relationship in how the use of information technology
increases sales.
Sales volume is higher in areas with greater housing price appreciation (%HPI).
Larger metropolitan areas, defined by total employment (Emp), also are positively and
significantly related to the dollar volume of housing sales. When these findings are
compared with Exhibit 1, it is evident that the percentage change in house prices appear
to positively influence the dollar volume of sales to a greater extent than the quantity of
houses sold. Agent dollar sales volumes are larger in bigger metropolitan areas, even
though they may sell fewer properties.
Exhibit 3 reports the estimates of the Income equation. The adjusted R-square value is
0.392. All coefficients are statistically significant at the 0.01 level or above except %HPI.
The Sales coefficient indicates that the average commission rate is about 1.6% on sales
of homes listed by other agents. For agents who sell their own listings, the average
commission rate increases by 1.8% to 3.4%. For agents who cooperate by letting
other agents sell their listings, the commission rate increases by 0.8% over the base rate
to 2.4%.
The findings shown in Exhibits 1–3 clearly resolve the paradox reported by Johnson,
Zumpano, and Anderson (2007): Agents earn more money by concentrating on listings
because the commission structure rewards such specialization. But not all agents can be
listing specialists because not all agents possess the knowledge, experience, and other
characteristics to be successful. These results accord with the work of Munneke and Yavas
(2001) showing how incentives affect agent performance and effort.
28 DANIEL T. WINKLER, G. DONALD JUD, AND TONY WINGLER
JHR (PW)
S
N
Implications and Conclusions
This study examines the interrelationships among the type of listing sales with respect
to the number of houses that are sold, total dollar sales, and income of agents. The
number of hours worked has the largest impact on the number of properties sold by
agents. The effect of real estate market experience is most pronounced in fostering the
ability of agents to generate listings for other agents to sell. Working for a large firm and
in a large office has a negative effect on the ability of agents to sell their own listings.
Stated differently, larger offices tend to foster agent cooperation. Surprisingly, there is no
evidence that franchise affiliation affects the number of home sales. However, the use of
Internet technology has a very strong effect on the number of homes sold.
The dollar volume of agent sales is highest for agents’ listings that are sold by other agents.
Agents who sell their own listings and those who sell other agents’ listings trail
significantly those who have other agents sell their listings. Also, agents with more
experience generate greater dollar sales. Experience increases both the quantity of houses
sold and the selling of higher-priced houses. In addition, sales volume is higher in larger
metropolitan areas with greater housing price appreciation.
The earnings of agents are directly related to the generation of sales, but the source of
the listing greatly affects agent income. While earnings increase by about 1.6% per dollar
of housing sales that are listed by others, agents who sell their own listings and those
who let other agents sell their listings earn higher marginal commission rates of 1.8% and
0.8%, respectively. This research shows that the ability to generate listings is essential to
generating high levels of income in residential real estate sales. The listings become the
platform from which agents can leverage their human capital in the generation of income.
However, the ability to generate listings is a skill related to experience, as well as to the
firm and market environment.
Appendix
Table A1. Means and Standard Deviations of Sample Variables
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Obs.
Dependent Variables
Elselist 7.85 5.00 282.00 0.00 11.06 4,185
Income 75,685.71 42,500.00 1,000,000.00 10,000.00 109,897.90 6,136
Otherlist 9.93 7.00 303.00 0.00 12.60 4,180
Ownlist 4.75 2.00 230.00 0.00 9.34 4,209
Sales 2,987,798.00 1,750,000.00 15,000,000.00 125,000.00 3,341,490.00 4,241
Independent Variables
%HPI 10.14 6.97 38.32 0.53 7.86 2,760
Black 0.04 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.20 6,136
Emp 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.23 6,136
Exp 11.45 8.00 40.00 1.00 10.59 6,092
Exp2 243.07 64.00 1,600.00 1.00 364.12 6,092
Female 0.55 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 6,136
Hrs 41.55 40.00 100.00 1.00 16.10 6,136
Indnfr 0.49 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.50 6,136
Married 0.73 1.00 1.00 0.00 0.45 6,136
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Table A1. Means and Standard Deviations of Sample Variables
(continued)
Mean Median Maximum Minimum Std. Dev. Obs.
Pelselist 1,130,178.00 583,333.30 15,000,000.00 0.00 1,574,235.00 3,789
Pownlist 577,842.40 187,500.00 15,000,000.00 0.00 1,087,161.00 3,789
Sch 14.62 14.00 20.00 10.00 1.98 6,131
Sfsizf 210.11 38.00 1,000.00 1.00 336.16 6,136
Sfsizoff 22.87 15.50 51.00 3.50 15.81 5,828
Techf 0.00 0.03 3.52 2.57 1.00 4,451
Endnotes
1 See Benjamin, Jud, and Sirmans (2000) for a comprehensive review of real estate brokerage
studies.
2 However, on an individual listing basis, while firm and individual agents provide advice to
sellers, the seller decides on the listing price. Sellers signal their motivation to sell through
setting listing prices and the inclusion of contractual provisions in their listing agreements
(Benjamin and Chinloy, 2000). The authors find that houses selling at or below market
benefit from more listing activity and sell faster, while above market price properties have
a longer time on the market. The longer time is not justified by the minimal additional yield
even with the additional market exposure.
3 Studies of economics efficiency have motivated numerous studies of commissions and
contractual arrangements including Anglin and Arnott (1991), Miceli (1991, 1995), Yavas
(1996), Buttimer (1998), and Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas (2005). In a study of flat-fee
and fixed-rate commissions, Yavas (1996) demonstrates that both systems maximize the
number of houses sold but minimize the surplus of buyers and sellers, while net listings
provide a greater surplus but result in fewer houses sold. Rutherford, Springer, and Yavas
(2005) examine the agency conflict arising from the percentage commission structure by
comparing price premiums and time on the market for agents who sell their own houses
versus those of clients. They find that while agent-owned houses sell no quicker, they do
sell at a price premium of about 4.5%, suggesting the existence of an agency problem.
4 In the framework of strategic orientation at the individual level, agents who work more
hours should also be more competitive; however, experience should be a moderating factor
on competitiveness.
5 Sirmans and Swicegood (2000), Benjamin, Jud, Roth, and Winkler (2002), and Jud, Winkler,
and Sirmans (2002) find a positive relationship between the use of technology and licensee
income.
6 The technology factor variable is constructed using four variables: (1) the number of third
party web-listings; (2) the existence of a personal webpage for business purposes; (3) the
existence of a firm webpage for firm listings; and (4) the proportion of real estate
transactions using email, wireless email, and instant messaging, respectively.
7 Studies by Follain, Lutes, and Meier (1987), Glower and Hendershott (1988), and Crellin,
Frew, and Jud (1988) support a positive and statistically significant relationship of
experience and schooling with income while the negative coefficient of minority status is
confirmed by Crellin, Few, and Jud. While sales and sales agent income are quantitatively
different variables, the strong relation between sales agent income and sales suggests that
firm size and franchise affiliation may also have a positive and significant relationship with
sales.
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8 Sirmans and Swicegood (2000) find a positive and statistically significant relation between
firm size and income; however, franchise is not statistically significant in its relation to sales
agent income.
9 The technology factor variable is constructed using six variables: (1) the number of third
party web-listings; (2) the existence of a personal webpage for business purposes; (3) the
existence of a firm webpage for firm listings; (4) the proportion of real estate transactions
using email; (5) the proportion of real estate transactions using wireless email; and (6) the
proportion of real estate transactions using instant messaging. The first factor has an
eigenvalue of 1.66 with 27.66% of explained variation. The second eigenvalue is 1.57 with
26.10% of explained variation. All other eigenvalues are less than 1.0. Only the first factor
was used in the regression because it had the expected factor pattern of all positive
coefficients for the six underlying technology variables. The factor pattern for the variables
is shown in parentheses as follows: (1) the number of third party web-listings (0.6569); (2)
the existence of a personal webpage for business purposes (0.6381); (3) the existence of
a firm webpage for firm listings (0.4845); and (4) the proportion of real estate transactions
using email (0.3908), wireless email, (0.4818) and instant messaging (0.4486), respectively.
10 OFHEO indexes do not share a common starting point for each metropolitan area.
Therefore, it is necessary to transform the index to create indexes with a common starting
year and quarter. The common starting point is the fourth quarter of 2003; that is, the base
for all metro price indexes is 2003.4  100.
11 The percentage increases are estimated by taking the first derivative of the regression
dependent variable with respect to the experience variable (Exp).
12 This study has not controlled for other extraneous influences such as the number of listings
per agent, the characteristics of listed properties, and the location of listed properties, for
example, to identify the reason for the negative Black coefficient.
13 Larger metropolitan areas likely have more competition; therefore, there are fewer houses
on average are sold by an individual agent. However, house prices in larger metropolitan
areas are also higher.
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